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Abstract: The terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo satirical magazine on January 7, 
2015, lead to a swift response from media conglomerates in the form of powerful 
images and narratives that sought to preserve the official mythology and to reverse 
the effects of the violent terrorist communication. In the dialectics of media repre-
sentations, the texts are transformed into images and images into icons. We are re-
ferring here to the highlighting of the Je suis Charlie theme as a particular image 
that was used as a rallying cry. Analysing the production of symbolic forms, espe-
cially in the international media representation with a special accent on headlines 
and visual and textual images we come to the conclusion that Je suis Charlie slogan 
suffered an ideological transformation, the image becoming a fetish. Hence, we have 
spoted an iconoclastic reaction from some international media outlets that were 
suggesting the need for an ambivalent narrative, avoiding an absolute, frozen mean-
ing.  
Keywords: Je suis Charlie, symbolic forms, fetishization, media, representations 
*** 
La dialectique de la représentation médiatique. Je suis Charlie comme fétichisation 
d'une image 
Résumé: L'attaque terroriste sur le magazine satirique Charlie Hebdo le 7 Janvier 
2015 conduit à une réponse rapide de la part des conglomérats médiatiques sous la 
forme des images puissantes et récits qui ont cherché à préserver la mythologie 
officielle et à inverser les effets de la communication terroriste violente. Dans la 
dialectique des représentations médiatiques, les textes sont transformés en images et 
les images en icônes. Nous parlons ici de la mise en evidence du thème « Je suis 
Charlie » comme image particulière qui a été utilisée comme un cri de ralliement. 
L'analyse de la production des formes symboliques, en particulier dans la représenta-
tion médiatique internationale avec un accent particulier sur les grands titres et les 
images visuelles et textuelles, nous arrivons à la conclusion que le slogan « Je suis 
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Charlie » a subi une transformation idéologique, l'image devenant un fétiche. Par 
conséquent, nous avons repéré une réaction iconoclaste de certains médias interna-
tionaux qui ont suggéré la nécessité d'une narration ambivalente, en évitant un sens 
figé, absolu. 
Mots-clés: Je suis Charlie, formes symboliques, fétichisation, médias, représenta-
tions 
*** 
Introduction 
The purpose of this article is to pursue a proper analysis of media representation as 
reported in the account of the attack on Charlie Hebdo magazine. While the cove-
rage of special events that are loaded with positive or negative content can be as-
signed to the dynamics of social ritualisation, in its relationship with the audience 
and institutions media is acting as a sacerdot (Petrof, 2015a ; Petrof, 2015b) and 
guardian (Nossek, 2004). In the particular case of the terrorist attack against the 
symbolic order as it is specified in this article as the attack on the satirical newspa-
per Charlie Hebdo, there is a need for a distinct approach from a media anthropolo-
gy perspective. In other words, the analysis seeks to identify specific elements of 
political, social and religious ritual that media has initiated through a new symbolic 
space created by a production of symbolic forms in the shape of narratives, mytho-
logies, and iconographies. The transmission of these productions is effectuated via 
the so-called technological support of mass communication. The distinct purpose of 
this transmission is not only to inform the public opinion and influence the state 
institutions but essentially to generate a symbolic construction able to restore the 
social order affected and endangered by the terrorist event, and further on, to coagu-
late any narrative and iconographic "leakage" into a uniform, singular, normative 
production. 
In analysing this type of media behavior, our inquiry is taking into account at least 
two elements. First, we assume that “any type of behaviour may be said to turn into 
a "ritual" when it is stylised or formalised and made repetitive in that form” (Nadel, 
1954 quoted by Elliott, 1981, p. 141). Due to the intrinsic dynamics of media, its 
ritualistic behavior is already a well documented fact, numerous studies in this res-
pect being more than revealing (Dayan et Katz, 1992; Rothenbuhler, 1998; Lule, 
2001; Askew et Wilk, 2002; Couldry, 2003; Rothenbuhler et Coman, 2005; Peter-
son, 2005; Lardellier, 2005; Cottle, 2006; Grimes, 2006; Nossek et Berkowitz, 2006; 
Berkowitz et Eco, 2006, 2009; Katz et Liebes, 2007; Nossek, 2008; Sumiala, 2013). 
Second, the media ritual could be an adequate conceptual tool to explain the 
mediated "convulsions" caused by a terrorist, disruptive event.  
For this research, based on observation and distinction suggested by Elliott (1981) 
in which “The treatment of such stories is highly predictable from one to another. 
They share the same formal grammar of treatment and development. In that deve-
lopment, considerable emphasis is put on the symbolic significance or interpretation 
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of the events. The symbolic as opposed to the representational meaning of the con-
tent is high, to borrow Gombrich's distinction, and the role of the authorities and 
their values visible and commended” (p. 143) we decided to follow this symbolic 
interpretation of the event, the international press being a fertile field for such ideas. 
Before moving to the practical analysis, a brief remark is required about how the 
de-contextualized journalists are conditioned to act when the event became public. 
This observation is based on the Nossek’s (2004) analysis who assumes that journa-
lists and editors are wearing a pair of indigenous "bifocals" when reporting on inter-
national news: one is national, the other professional. What "lens" will define the 
narrative depends on certain factors: “(1) the type of event (some form of political 
violence, namely war, terrorism, political assassination, etc.); (2) the location of the 
event (is the locality relevant to the domestic politics and foreign policy or interna-
tional relations of the journalist and media’s nation state?); and (3) the event context 
(the timing of the event and its local and international context) … Only when the 
event is defined as either ‘ours’ or ‘theirs’, can the journalist decide whether to 
apply a professional or a national patriotic ‘frame’ …” (p. 349-350).  
Particularizing the analysis at the social-historical level of the terrorist event on 
January 7, 2015, in Paris, some procedural observations should be taken into ac-
count before tackling the dynamics of media representations. At one level, the way 
media reported the event could be perceived as a form of journalistic solidarity. 
Traumatic and terrorising situations do have the ability to standardise not only the 
appearance of the reports but the content as well (Berkowitz et Eko, 2006, p. 1). At a 
deeper level though, "engagement on the issue by other news media represents 
something larger: the maintenance of the journalistic paradigm and the sacred right 
of the journalistic culture in which it resides" (idem). Maintaining the paradigm of 
journalism and the sacred right of French culture are predictable and identifiable 
features. French media representations are stemming from a clearly defined vision 
regarding major issues specific to a terrorist event (freedom of expression, sacred 
and profane, secularism, cartoons tradition, Islam, violence). However, this is not 
the case with the international press that is not directly involved and affected by and 
displays an ambivalence on these issues, the production of symbolic forms being 
quite diverse. Following Elliott's idea (1981) who suggests that “The analysis of 
ritual can then be placed in 'a class-structured, conflictual and pluralistic model of 
society' rather than a unitary, integrated consensual one” (p. 142) the purpose of this 
analysis is to identify the dynamics of media representations in such a conflictual 
space. In fact, it is a symbolic space created by the international media. 
 
1. Methodology 
Pertaining the methodology, we have inclined toward a qualitative analysis given 
the fact that our aim was to identify those iconographic and narrative themes in the 
international media, the very themes that are the most visible, influential, explicit 
and within one month remained stable in the journalistic accounts. Particularly, it is 
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an empirical analysis conducted exclusively through the Internet and new digital 
technologies. We have opted for this solution not only for purely practical reasons 
but especially for having the opportunity to access a variety of sources and then 
select them according to the objectives pursued. Thus, Flipboard app1 available for 
smartphones and tablets, was used for this purpose. Employing an iPhone, over 4000 
pages of content were “flipped”2 and gathered under the following categories: News, 
Religion, Islam, France, Cartoons, Free Speech, Tragédie à Charlie Hebdo, Terro-
rism to identify those pages related to Charlie Hebdo attack. Subsequently, on the 
personal account it was set up a category generically labelled "Charlie Hebdo" 
where for one month, between 7 January to 7 February 2015, more than 400 articles 
were chosen. Using the website www.flipboard.com all collected content could be 
perused in a larger space such as computer screen (see Annex n°1). Afterwards, on 
this website we have completed the selection of articles. Certain criteria were behind 
this selection. First, the sources that gave just a factual report of the terrorist attack 
were removed. However, some were kept for the historical and social contextualiza-
tion of the event. Second, as we have previously argued, the focus was English 
sources, these journalistic accounts having priority in this research. Thirdly, even 
within the English sources another selection was operated.  
Specifically, we identified those major media outlets that have the ability to pro-
duce and transmit consistent iconographic narrative and symbolic forms, complex, 
constant and conflictual. Following this process, we reduced the number of articles 
to 110. That did not mean a dismissal of the French sources. We kept a certain per-
centage of the content for three reasons: (1) to confirm the trend of national media to 
generate a unified, consensual, normative production of symbolic forms into a space 
that being frontally attacked by an disturbing event tends to contract and concentrate 
into one point, the journalistic production being sucked  into a “black hole” of natio-
nal, partisan, official mythology; (2) the need to contextualize the socio-historical 
event that occurred, some reports in the national press being used as benchmarks for 
marking the analytical “territory”; (3) although we did not undertake a comparative 
study, the French sources served though as a “contrast agent” for a better view of 
those details in the narrative and iconographic flow, distinct to international media. 
After analysing these 110 articles we identified six principal themes. Embedded in 
a complex narrative discourse, they have been outlined as follows: Je suis Charlie, 
the freedom of expression, the semantics of terrorism, the hermeneutics of Islam, the 
clash of civilisations, and the semiotics of blasphemy. Due to the limited space of 
                                                            
1 Flipboard is a social-network aggregation, magazine-format mobile app localized in more than 20 
languages. The software collects content from social media and other websites, presents it in magazine 
format, and allows users to "flip" through their social-networking feeds and feeds from websites that have 
partnered with the company. (Source: Wikipedia).  
2 flip, whence comes the name of the application means browse, given that in order to acces the content 
the index finger mimics the same movement when touching the screen surface look through digital de-
vice. For the smartphone the movement is vertically from bottom to top or vice versa if to return to the 
previous page and for the tablets the movement is horizontally from right to left or vice versa if going 
back to the previous content. 
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this article we shall address the first theme only, Je suis Charlie, the others being the 
subject of other approaches. Those narratives, iconographies and myths were pur-
sued as they were represented in the international media and served as ideological 
material in the production of symbolic forms. 
To « protect » therefore the text from possible “deterioration” whenever a para-
phrase is employed extended quotations from selected sources were applied. To 
achieve this goal, the following techniques were used. First, a content analysis to 
capture significant elements of reporting - in this matter the headlines and the textual 
images were analysed. Second, based on the analysis we identified the myths that 
were fixed in the form and the content of these reports. Finally, after collecting all 
materials for one month, after the attack happened, some keywords were examined 
that could indicate the « news frames » either of a national or of a professional na-
ture. 
Further on, the following sources were used in our analysis, both from English and 
French media outlets: Le Figaro, Libération, Paris Match, Le Monde, Le Point fol-
lowed by The New Yorker, Slate, The Independent, The Huffington Post, The New 
York Times, The Guardian, The Atlantic, BBC, CNN, The Spectator, Salon, The 
Telegraph, The New Republic, The Daily Beast, Forbes, Der Spiegel, New States-
man, Russia Today, China Daily, Deutche Welle, Foreign Policy, Prospect Maga-
zine, National Journal, BuzzFeed News, Rolling Stone, Montreal Gazette, The Star, 
The Indian Express, International Business Times, Financial Times, The Washington 
Post, Politico, Al Jazeera, plus some websites which may enjoy the same notoriety 
as the above sources but are sufficiently influential in the online space. However, for 
this particular article only some of them were engaged, due to the limited space. 
 
2. Results 
Je suis Charlie is a popular theme, in this direction most of the iconographic and 
narrative representations being displayed in the national and especially the interna-
tional media. Created by French artist Joachim Roncin and posted on Twitter an 
hour after the terrorist attack, the text became viral on the social network and used 
over 6,500 times per minute (The Telegraph, 09.01.2015). It become one of the most 
popular labels in the history of Twitter (CNNMoney, 01/09/2015) rapidly extending 
outside cyberspace in the written form of banners, badges, displays and various 
signs. In one word the image created by Roncin quickly became « an international 
rallying cry for free speech, and a symbol of resistance to terror and solidarity with 
its victims » (The Atlantic, 01.16.2015). However, in the international representa-
tions the very idea of solidarity has proved problematic because shortly after Je suis 
Charlie was launched as a civic self-contained « brand » media began to release the 
antithesis too in the explicit form of the “Je ne suis Charlie” or in different formulas 
that explain the lack of identification. 
In “We Are Not All Charlie” (The Atlantic, 08/01/2015), the author suggests that 
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despite the ubiquity appellation not all are Charlie: “Much of Europe, which, as a 
political entity, is not fully grappling with the totalitarian madness of Islamism, is 
not Charlie. Certainly much of journalism is not Charlie. Any outlet that censors 
Charlie Hebdo cartoons out of fear of Islamist reprisal is not Charlie”. Even Barack 
Obama was marked in this category as "negationist" because of his ambivalent posi-
tion toward Islam: “If the future does not belong to those who slander the prophet of 
Islam—in other words, to people who speak freely and offensively—then it belongs 
to those who would suppress by force any criticism of religion. This is not an Ame-
rican idea, and it certainly isn’t Charlie”. Goldberg's conclusion is rightly Mani-
chaean: either become Charlie or there is no future. 
What does it means to be Charlie? On the same line of analysis but contextualized 
to the realities in Lebanon is the observation made by Ghaddar in the article entitled 
“Are we really Charlie Hebdo?”. The Lebanese author laments the lack of solidarity 
with the victims of similar events occurring in Lebanon: “What did we really do 
when Samir Kassir and Gebran Tweini were murdered? What do we do any day that 
a fellow journalist is threatened or intimidated? A few articles get published, some 
activists on social media talk about it for a couple of days, and then we all go back 
to our pathetic everyday lives, waiting for the next death, the next threat, and the 
next censorship.  … we do not have the right to be part of #jesuischarlie and say that 
we care until we start with ourselves” (NOW, 9/01/2015). In her appeal to the Leba-
nese public the author is distancing herself from the predictable temptation of “the 
clash of civilizations” theme, usually the dominant narrative in the Western debates, 
designating the territory of the real conflict within the space of values and secular 
beliefs, a conflict that should concerns all of us: “ It is not about “Europe vs. the 
Terrorists” or “The West against Jihadists.” It is about all of us — liberals — against 
all of them — fanatics. It is about freedom of speech and those who want to silence 
us…. Therefore, it is not enough to condemn, to tweet solidarity or #jesuischarlie to 
show the world that we are the good guys “ (NOW, 9/01/2015).  
From an American perspective now, under the headline “I Am Not Charlie Heb-
do”, the journalist David Brooks captures the double discourse when it comes to 
freedom of speech in America. That kind of militant satire practiced by Charlie 
Hebdo would not be possible in the United States due to an internal mechanism of 
self-censorship beginning with the academia and ending with anti-discrimination 
organizations. Hence his surprise vis-à-vis the manifestations of solidarity with 
Charlie Hebdo: “Public reaction to the attack in Paris has revealed that there are a 
lot of people who are quick to lionize those who offend the views of Islamist terro-
rists in France but who are a lot less tolerant toward those who offend their own 
views at home” (The New York Times, 08/01/2015). The theory advanced by Nossek 
could explain the “duplicity” of the American public space but somehow suited to 
those grass root producers of symbolic forms like a public or an audience. Once the 
terrorist event has been labeled as being “foreign” then they apply the “professional” 
lens (Nossek, 2004). This perspective allows them to be attached to a form of ex-
pression seen as “heroic” on the outside but “scandalous” within as long as this is 
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not reproduced in their territory. This solidarity is a simulacrum generated by the 
media that produces the illusion of identification through a proxy: a pencil, a sign, a 
sign or flag, meaningless signs when reproduced and transformed into different 
territory. Although Barthes (1977) believes that representations are not just “simple 
agglutinations of symbols” (p. 32) but generators of own meaning production, the 
“original” image transposed into a new context does not automatically reproduce the 
meaning; it is created or recreated only to the extent that the audience shares the 
same values and act in this regard. In other words, Je suis Charlie transposed in the 
American space lacks the “aura” not just because of the process of reproduction 
itself but primarily by re-territorialisation of the symbol in an entirely different pu-
blic space: “whatever you might have put on your Facebook page yesterday, it is 
inaccurate for most of us to claim, Je Suis Charlie Hebdo, or I Am Charlie Hebdo. 
Most of us don’t actually engage in the sort of deliberately offensive humor that that 
newspaper specializes in” (The New York Times, 08/01/2015). 
In the same note is written the editorial signed by Cas Mudd who under the hea-
dline “No, we are NOT all Charlie (and that’s a problem)” argues that the symbolic 
parade on the social networks under the "flag" Je sui Charlie is insubstantial for 
three reasons: “[First]… Many people are not Charlie exactly because Charlie Heb-
do would criticize all religions and all politicians, irrespective of their ethnicity, 
gender, ideology, etc. … Second, many people are not Charlie because they believe 
that democratic debates should be “civil” and not upset people. … Third, and final, 
many people are not Charlie because they are afraid” (Open Democracy, 
07/01/2015). In other words, Je suis Charlie is emptied of meaning in a space that 
does not allow a total identification with all the citizens and all the attitudes: “we 
should live up to our slogans and truly embrace freedom of speech for all, including 
anti-Semites and Islamophobes! Similarly, we should criticize and satirize all, from 
atheists to Christians, from Jews to Muslims, and from Greens to the far right” 
(idem). In these media representations, Je suis Charlie is presented as the symbol of 
freedom of expression, total, frontal and conflictual, the other hermeneutical details 
vis-à-vis the limits of legality, appropriateness or sensitivity being completely irre-
levant, especially in a case of a force majeure such as that of a terrorist attack. In 
this setting, the prevailing narrative is that of a perpetual conflict where the mere 
formal participation with flags, pencils and slogans is not enough. Through substan-
tial involvement at the local level and the transformation of any attack on freedom of 
expression in a definite social movement similar to Je suis Charlie there is hope and 
future for the secular and democratic values. 
But not all journalists believe that the fight against fundamentalism, bigotry and 
extremism can rally behind Je suis Charlie. The executive producer for Al Jazeera 
English has openly expressed his skepticism vis-à-vis the dominant narrative in the 
European space wondering if that terrorist attack was really against freedom of ex-
pression and whether Je suis Charlie could have an alienating feature indeed. In the 
email sent to reporters, he offered other hermeneutic perspectives: “*This is a clash 
of extremist fringes… *Was this really an attack on “Free speech”? Who is attack-
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ing free speech here exactly? Does an attack by 2-3 guys on a controversial maga-
zine equate to a civilizational attack on European values...? Really? *Danger in 
making this a free speech aka “European Values” under attack binary is that it once 
again constructs European identity in opposition to Islam (sacred depictions) and 
cements the notion of a European identity under threat from an Islamic retrograde 
culture of which the attackers are merely the violent tip of the iceberg” (BuzzFeed 
News, 10/01/2015). Following different reactions from the reporters in the field it 
was observed within a division relating to how to interpretation the attack on the 
French publication. A solution of "compromise" adopted in fact by many journalists 
is that expressed by an Al Jazeera reporter in the following formula « I condemn 
those heinous killings, but I’M NOT CHARLIE”. 
On the same note goes the journalist from the Daily Beast with an article entitled 
“Trolls and Martyrdom: Je Ne Suis Pas Charlie” when he says that “I join with those 
who call for grief at the deaths of twelve human beings—but I’m not down with 
mourning the work that Charlie Hebdo was doing or standing up and saying “Je Suis 
Charlie,” like what they did was a holy mission” (Daily Beast, 09/01/2015). The 
issue of identification is also problematic for the Salon’s journalist that under the 
headline “The problem with “Je Suis Charlie”: That kind of solidarity comes with 
baggage”, suggests a semantic "baggage" attached to the motto Je sui Charlie:  "So 
what does it really mean to say” I Am Charlie Hebdo”? It can run the gamut from “I 
am a defender of free speech” (see above) to “I think Islam is ridiculous and dange-
rous” to “I am a rabid French chauvinist” (Salon, 11/01/2015). Instead, other journa-
lists under the same aegis “Je Ne Suis Pas Charlie” bring to the public a different 
argument against the inopportune slogan. 
In the “Spare a Thought for Those Who Are Not Charlie” Rosa Brooks considers 
that there is a discrimination and politicization vis-à-vis the victims of terrorism: “If 
you want to be mourned by millions of marchers and eulogized by dozens of re-
verential world leaders, apparently you need to be Charlie Hebdo — and no one in 
Nigeria makes the cut” (Foreign Policy, 15/01/2015) then continuing to count the 
victims of terrorism close to the date of January 7, 2015, in Mogadishu, Pakistan, 
Lebanon or Mali without the minimal benefit from the media coverage. Her conclu-
sion is predictable: “Yes, we should mourn the deaths at Charlie Hebdo, and stand 
up for free expression and a world safe from terrorist violence. So go ahead, wave 
your pencil in the air. Be Charlie, if you must. But while you’re at it spare a thought 
for all the non-Charlies out there, too” (idem). 
However, Scott Sayare from The Atlantic in “What Je Suis Charlie Has Become” 
turn the argument against France. There is no need to look abroad to see that not all 
victims of terrorism benefits from the same publicity. In this regard, the journalist 
indicates the southern France where in 2012 seven French citizens of Arab and 
Hebrew origin were killed, the journalist wondering why there was not a similar 
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reaction to this atrocity, why no one bore the sign "Je suis Myriam”3. The argument 
is that of identity and proximity: the population in its majority “did not "identify" 
with minority soldiers or practicing Jews. It has identified, instead, with the staff of 
Charlie Hebdo, mostly white men and women devoted to an unstinting indictment 
of religion …” and the terrorist attack was far away from Paris, "the seat of French 
political and cultural power” (The Atlantic, 30/01/2015). The coverage of Charlie 
Hebdo attack would reveal a schism regarding the identification: “France in its enti-
rety is not Charlie, just as France in its entirety was not represented at the march on 
January 11. Missing were the Arabs, the blacks, the young people from the poor 
banlieues, and the Muslims, many of whom see in Charlie not themselves but the 
majority's self-righteous bully, and who see in laïcité not a principle of equal 
treatment but a device of discrimination and hypocrisy”. 
All these journalistic reports that question the “legality” of the motto bring to the 
fore the problematic issue of identifying with Je suis Charlie. This slogan either 
cannot be regarded as an incarnation of Western or European values since Charlie 
Hebdo is not considered a symbol of France and the freedom of expression due to its 
narrow niche where the publication is stuck, either the slogan reflects a mixture of 
variegated attitudes and beliefs that could degenerate into a huge anti-Islamic 
movement or the coverage and internationalisation of the slogan is conditioned on 
political and ideological grounds, most victims of other terrorist acts being utterly 
ignored. What these ideas have in common is the attitude towards the sacralisation 
of the Je suis Charlie, a sacralisation of the profane, an attitude expressed very well 
in the following words “the march, the slogan, and the ideology they celebrated have 
been sacralized, posited as the fundaments of a new national unity, a renewed patrio-
tic self-confidence” (The Atlantic, 30/01/2015) and in the jeremiad “When the only 
thing you’re reverent of is irreverence, when the only thing you hold sacred is the 
idea that nothing is sacred, well, … , you get one long continuous blast of pure of-
fensiveness and taboo-breaking for taboo-breaking’s sake until all taboos are broken 
and there’s nothing left to say” (The Daily Beast, 09/01/2015). From these examples 
and highlighted words4 it is obvious that the journalists in the Anglosphere are pre-
senting themselves as official “prophets” reacting to the new French national mytho-
logy through a denunciation of the "idols". They are “inspired” to warn the people of 
the danger of idolatry, thus disintegrating the new « golden calf » in the ashes of the 
iconoclastic images. 
 
3. Analysis and interpretation 
Images do have the ability to polarize the attitudes, and this is due to a certain, ba-
sic ontology: “The best evidence for the life of images is the passion with which we 
seek to destroy or kill them. Iconophilia and iconophobia make sense only to people 
                                                            
3 It is the story of Myriam Monsonégo, a six-year girl shot in the head by the assailant who opened fire 
against a Hebrew school in Toulouse on 19 March 2012. 
4 The bold letters are not found in the original text; they are our adition to outline the religios language. 
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who think images are alive” (Mitchell, 2013, p. 90). Apparently, the "vitalistic" 
thesis proposed by Mitchell is not a hermeneutic caprice specific to art critics that 
permanently are in search for new meanings but reflects a deep concern for the dia-
lectics of image either as iconoclastic rhetoric or as iconophile manifesto. Eventual-
ly, this is the polarizing effect of the image: “Images lend themselves equally to 
being displayed and venerated and to be desecrated and destroyed” (Belting, 1994, 
p. 1). 
The icon becomes the currency for all secular or religious transactions, the motiva-
ting force in the social and political sphere because it is only through its presence 
there is a mediation between the government and the citizens: “… the theocracy of 
the visible becomes the key to all authority … “(Modzain, 2005, p. 166). In this 
context, the genuine dispute is revolving around this issue – how to manage, to con-
trol the image, the power of the icon and thus to monopolise the visual economy and 
with it even the truth: “Truth is in the image, there is no image of truth. … It is be-
cause this image has power that it is necessary to defend and protect it. It is not be-
cause it is true that it has power. It is because it has power that it becomes true, that 
it must be true” (p. 201). The iconoclasts do not reject the power of the image; they 
just want to control it. The image is power, and there is no power without the image 
(Modzain, 2005, p. 158) the one who controls the form also controls the substance. 
If the icon can be managed, then the image will be subject to the authority who did 
that possible according to the consubstantiality principle – to represent itself the 
image is dependent on the icon, but the icon would become a hollowed object wi-
thout the presence of the image. In this setting, in the name of visibility and 
usefulness, the support that is artificial and material becomes even more important 
than the substance or the natural image. Thus, the icon replaces the image and in 
religious language this is pronounced idolatry. 
On the other hand, like the ritual, the icon has an integrator role, bounding au-
dience in a social construct. The icon serves as a symbol for order, providing “a 
sense of origin, destiny, and participation in that order… furnishing a context where 
the individuals can locate themselves” (Goethals, 1981, pp. 33-34). The sacred 
image is the very tool that can mediate between sacred and profane and media gene-
rates icons to mediate this relationship. More than that, the image as allegorical, 
symbolical entity possess a mysterious life, an aura (Benjamin, 1939); it is a fetish 
object generating signs that for the viewer may seem indecipherable as a hieroglyph 
(Marx, 2007). If the medium is the message (McLuhan, 1994) is that because the 
icon has a life of its own. It can generate a production of meaning of its own in the 
sense that the image itself (let us call it the "pure" image, either as a representation 
or as something else) must transmit a series of messages. Sometimes a signs is not 
generated a priori, and indeed the image contains signs they are not always explicit 
(Barthes, 1977).  
Although they are visual signals, codified in a hermetic language their textual un-
derstanding is not the priority here but the transfer of power and value. The image 
has power and the user feels protected and empowered in its presence. Even the 
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prohibition to look at the image5, is based on the magic, sacred character of the 
image which the iconophile must take into account if she wants to stay in the protec-
tion space of her fetish. 
A fetish is an object assigned with an intrinsic value specifically because it is a 
manifestation of power. Even if the production is human and material, basically is a 
representation of a supernatural; the materialization of this authority in the shape of 
an object does not diminish its power because it was transferred along with the pro-
duction of the object. When the fetish no longer generates protection, power, luck, it 
can be abandoned or destroyed since remains just a devoid object. The fact is that 
the image has a propensity to this fetishisation process, and media is largely contri-
buting in this regard. 
A first observation about the fetishisation of the image in the context of media re-
presentations is how the national and international media used the image as text and 
visual image in the production of symbolic forms. We are referring to the highligh-
ting of the Je suis Charlie theme as a particular image. In this aspect, there is a pro-
duction of images where media is trying to convert the event from news and journa-
listic narrative into a visual image. In this respect, Charlie Hebdo, freedom, blas-
phemy, Islam, terrorism and conflict are not just fundamental narratives specific to 
the production of symbolic forms but mostly “projected” images from media space 
towards the public space for what might be called the iconifying of the social space 
(Goethals, 1990). This is the point when the image becomes an icon: “Terrorism, 
both the spectacle and the word, seems to have emerged as the idol of our time, 
demanding the “ultimate sacrifice” both from the terrorists and from those who 
mobilize the world to stap it out” (Mitchell, 2013, p. 190). The manner in which, for 
example, international media treats these topics, sometimes in contrast with the 
French representations confirms an actualisation of the old iconoclastic conflict. 
Specifically, statements like “freedom of expression is not an absolute”, “Je ne suis 
Charlie”, “Islam is a victim”, “the blasphemy should be regulated”, “terrorism is a 
consequence of imperialism” and the “clash of civilizations” are just a few examples 
of iconoclastic strategies aiming to overthrow the dominant images provided by the 
national press and some international media outlets, images perceived by others as 
already fetishized. 
The fact is, as mentioned above, that always would be an ambivalent position vis-
à-vis the image itself. However, when the image coagulates its meaning and 
becomes normative and frozen as an icon, the iconoclastic reaction is becoming 
visible. The media has the potential to coagulate the meaning of an image through 
an iconifying representation that may even lead to the elimination of the meaning 
production. In this context, it could be mentioned the media reaction toward the 
iconifying of the victim’s terrorist attack. Although there were a total of 12 victims 
only fallen cartoonists were represented in the production of images and from these 
just the image of the four – Charb, Cabu, Wolinski and Tignous – succeeded in the 
                                                            
5 That was the case with some fetishes where no gaze was permited (see C. de Brosses, 1972, p. 174) 
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visual and textual iconography (Slate, 12/01/2015; Le Point, 07/01/2015; The Huf-
fington Post, 07/01/2105) and sometimes only Charb's image was uplifted as the 
final symbol. 
Specifically, during the Republican march the partial picture of Charb’s face fo-
cused on his glasses was used as a symbol of protest against the attack on Charlie 
Hebdo. Added to this it was the ubiquitous visual sign Je suis Charlie. Here we are 
dealing with images and symbols that are treated as icons and to which some media 
outlets reacted in an iconoclast manner. For example, “Je suis Ahmed”6 failed to 
impose itself despite repeated attempts by a narrow segment of the public and the 
media. However, the media partially invoked the alternative slogan in an attempt to 
balance the dominant iconography that now become official (The Herald, 
19/01/2015; Daily Mail, 09/01/2015; The Independent, 13/01/2015).  
However, as we pointed out earlier in the article when we analysed the media re-
presentations of Je suis Charlie, the iconoclastic reaction was observed mostly 
against this slogan. Here are some examples, just from the headlines: “We Are Not 
All Charlie” (The Atlantic, 08/01/2015); “Are we really Charlie Hebdo?” (NOW, 
9/01/2015); “I Am Not Charlie Hebdo” (The New York Times, 08/01/2015); “Trolls 
and Martyrdom: Je Ne Suis Pas Charlie” (Daily Beast, 09/01/2015); “The problem 
with “Je Suis Charlie”: That kind of solidarity comes with baggage” (Salon, 
11/01/2015); “Spare a Thought for Those Who Are Not Charlie” (Foreign Policy, 
15/01/2015); “A la recherche des «  je ne suis pas Charlie  »” (Bondy Blog, 19/01/15) 
whereas at the content level the iconoclasm being more pronounced and refined. 
In “L’hommage unanime de la presse nationale” Paris Match presents on a black 
background a series of 32 images of the front pages of the national press (see Annex 
2) which describes succinctly as follows: “In the French press, a tribute to the 12 
dead including the renowned cartoonists after the Kalashnikov attack on Wednesday 
in Paris committed against 'Charlie Hebdo' newspaper is expressed in black back-
grounds and drawings. "We are all Charlie," is the newspaper "Liberation" headline. 
The reference brandished by many marchers at the rallies from Wednesday night is 
very often found in daily headlines. "Freedom murdered," claims "Le Figaro" that 
publishes photos of six of the victims: cartoonists Cabu, Charb, Honoré, Tignous, 
Wolinski and the columnist Bernard Maris. In an editorial entitled "War", the editor 
of the newspaper announces "a real war, conducted not by the murderers of the sha-
dow but by methodical and organized killers, whose quiet savagery ices blood"” 
(Paris Match, 08/01/2015).  
It is interesting to note the construction of meaning in these images where key-
words that appear in combinations of black, red and white colour with photographs 
or cartoons related to the tragedy or simply a black background with the word NON 
(no) serves to indicate the one way only sign of this conceptual “avenue” (see Annex 
n° 2). In this context expressions like freedom, assassination, murder, Nous sommes 
tous Charlie, Je suis Charlie, press, barbarism, solidarity become buzzwords. Add 
                                                            
6 It is about Merabet Ahmed, a Muslim policeman murdered in the street by the two terrorist brothers. 
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to this the images of the four emblematic cartoonists Cabu, Charb, Tignous, Wolins-
ki, the “Je suis Charlie” sign or even some graphic details of the terrorist attack 
(glass penetrated by bullets, the street occupied by police cars) and even elements 
from the vigil attended by the crowd (candles, flowers, pens, inscriptions and parti-
cipants on street at night). In all these constructed symbolic forms we are dealing 
with a production of meaning that is dependent on the circumstantial and tragic 
aspect of the terrorist attack, all representations in the national press reflecting the 
dramatic symbolism of the assassination of the very idea of freedom, the idea that is 
materialised in the production and transmission of graphic signs (cartoons) through 
real people. 
However, the meaning produced with this formula is not fluid, changeable or ne-
gotiable but has one feature only – is frozen in text and images that do not allow 
ambiguity. It can be said in this connection that the national press almost “sealed” 
the production of meaning for at least two reasons: (1) due to the state of exception 
as a result of terrorist attack, paradoxically, the freedom of expression is "sus-
pended" in the sense that alternative7  interpretations of events could obscure the 
dominant narrative already confirmed through media representations, the symbolic 
order being in danger of disintegration and the audience in need for a symbolic 
centre of power that can relate to; (2) because the object of the attack was not just 
the publication itself, or even the human casualties but the sacred concept of 
freedom then the meaning of the production of symbolic forms should be locked 
since the sacred cannot be negotiated or understood but accepted as such or rejected 
as a single, normative, absolute construction of meaning. In particular, the television 
is operating with direct communication with specific reference points and visuals, 
images that freezes ideas in a solid form, the meaning being coagulated (Petrof, 
2015a, p. 192). That means that the visuals images become absolute compared with 
the textual ones, imposing a limitation on the audience, thus affecting the possibility 
of scepticism (Weber, 1991, p. 154). 
 
Conclusions 
This research was focused on how the production of symbolic forms transmitted 
through media representations were materialized in the case of the terrorist attack on 
Charlie Hebdo magazine with a specific interest on Je suis Charlie slogan. When 
social order is threatened or affected by destabilizing acts of political or religious 
violence media initiates a ritual that seeks to restore the order and generate a spirit of 
solidarity among the audience thus reconfirming the dominant narrative of society. 
The role of media can be likened to that of a guard who is called to preserve the 
symbolic order from disturbing elements and with that of a sacerdot that mediate the 
                                                            
7 Beyond the oficial accusations, it might explain why the expression used by Dieudonné « Sachez que ce 
soir, en ce qui me concerne, Je me sens Charlie Coulibaly » was immediately challenged and contested by 
the authorities and the media has initiated a boycott against the French comedian. 
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relationship between sacred and profane giving to the public the certainty by resto-
ring the social balance. 
Specifically, we sought to identify how the media initiates this ritual that it is at the 
confluence of mediatisation of the terrorism as a “necessary” act of journalistic 
choreography and the ideologisation of the public space as a communicational stra-
tegy. Media seeks to protect the public sensibilities by defusing threats and alarmist 
messages produced by the terrorist communication, calming the spirit of the au-
dience through images and narratives to restore the confidence, normalcy, thus re-
confirming the democratic values and the resilience against terror (Nossek, 2004, p. 
327).  
In the case of those violent, disturbing events that threaten the social order media 
is mobilised automatically as an instinctual response of society's “immune system”. 
When being attacked by “pathogens” that initiates aggression at the cellular level of 
society media must, therefore, respond immediately and efficiently, protecting the 
social organism. However, this organic, natural reaction does not lack ideological 
connotations mostly because the intervention of media in society is realized on a 
complex ideological repertoire, ideology in this sense being that mechanism by 
which the social construction of reality is produced.  
Not only television has this effect but any visual or textual representation that uses 
icons instead of images, narratives instead of reports. The international press em-
ployed the same strategy as the national one but temporarily and strictly contextua-
lized in the very time and space allocated to the dramatic event. On the first day of 
the attack, the international press followed the model of the French media requiring 
a precise, normative meaning through visual, explicit depictions. However, alterna-
tive views began to apear several days after when the event was converted from an 
image into a text, the meaning becoming immediately fluid. “In direct contrast to the 
visual image, the text employs a different form of communication, an indirect con-
tact where the vagueness of the language, ambiguity of the writing and possibility of 
doubt permit individuals to see things in a new way, to germinate new ideas that can 
be transferred into culture” (Petrof, 2015a, p. 192). Hence in the recurring themes of 
international press the text plays a fundamental role, images losing their normative 
effect created in the aftermath of the attack.  
Image fetishism is a phenomenon that belongs to the historical dialectic of the evo-
lution of the image in the collective imagination, but it is also a modern practice 
thanks to the particular means of mass communication, media being able to generate 
a production of visual symbolic forms that could become normative. The image is 
no longer seen as “transparent, windows of the world” but more like a sort of signs 
that represent a constructed appearance. The image is not what appears to be but 
what was constructed to represent. Behind this process of mediation is concealed 
“an opaque, distorting, arbitrary mechanism of representation, a process of ideologi-
cal mystification” (Mitchell, 2003, p. 8 ; see also Petrof, 2014).  
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In the circumstances of Charlie Hebdo attack on January 7, 2015, the international 
press highlighted a category of those who do not identify themselves with the Je suis 
Charlie. Because its ideological meaning the slogan was seen as not being repre-
sentative of those who do not share the mission statement of the French publication 
or for those who although they suffered the same violent treatment have not been 
sanctified in eternal images. On the other hand, the media suggests that although 
there could be a majority of people who would not identify themselves with the ideal 
materialized in Je suis Charlie motto, despite their statements, marches, and ap-
pearances sympathetic with the French magazine, they are not quite Charlie. These 
representations in the form of narratives and iconographies establish the ambiva-
lence of this famous slogan and its fetishization as a normative, absolute image. 
In media representations, Je suis Charlie become such a fetishised image, em-
ployed by national media and some international press as a communicational and 
ideological strategy to preserve the symbolic order in society in the aftermath of the 
terrorist attack. However, some international media outlets approached the slogan 
from an iconoclast perspective in order to de-mistify it and to engage the audience in 
an open dialog, that image and narrative production would stay ambivalent and 
fluid. 
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Annex n° 1. The Charlie Hebdo category of articles as an example of how they were acces-
sed and selected 
 
 
Annex n° 2. PARIS MATCH, « L’hommage unanime de la presse nationale », Paris Match, 
08/01/2015 and LES ECHOS, « Charlie Hebdo: la presse française et internationale boulever-
sée », Les Echos, 08/01/2015 
 
 
 
 
